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Defining California Civil Code
Section 47(3): The Resurgence of
Self-Governance
Fred H. Cate*
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court ruled in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan I that a public official cannot recover damages for libel
unless he proves that the alleged libel was published with knowledge of
its falsity or with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity, a standard that
the Court called "actual malice."' 2 In the 1971 case, Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia, Inc. ,3 a plurality of the Court applied the New York Times stan-
dard of actual malice to a defamation action brought by a private
individual where the allegedly defamatory story involved a matter of
public interest.
Only three years later, the Court overruled Rosenbloom in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.4 The Court held that where the plaintiff is a private
individual, the level of constitutional protection that extends to publi-
cations by the media may be less than New York Times actual malice.
Gertz allowed states to establish their own standards of liability, pro-
vided that liability was not imposed without regard to fault and that
punitive damages were not awarded without proof of New York Times
actual malice.5
States have responded to Gertz by creating a variety of standards of
liability for libel actions involving private plaintiffs, ranging from negli-
* Third year student, Stanford Law School. I am grateful to Marc Franklin, Frederick I.
Richman Professor of Law, Stanford University, for his counsel and insight. He is, of course,
not responsible for the conclusions or any errors that follow.
1. 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
2. "Actual malice" is a troubling term throughout libel law. At common law, it referred
to actual ill will, hatred, or spite. See, e.g., Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 86
N.W. 323 (1901). In New York Times, however, the Supreme Court defined "actual malice" as
"knowledge that it [the statement] was false" or "reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not." 376 U.S. at 280.
Where the definition of "actual malice" is not clear from the context, this note will use
the term "common law actual malice" to refer to actual ill will, hatred, or spite. This note will
use the term "New York Times actual malice" to indicate the "knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard" standard.
3. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
4. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
5. l at 347-49. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939
(1985), the Supreme Court reinterpreted Gertz to apply only where the allegedly defamatory
publication involves a matter of public interest.
1201
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
gence to actual malice.6 California appears to be among those states
adopting the latter standard. Some California courts have interpreted
California Civil Code Section 47(3)7-which protects communications
between "interested" persons-broadly to require proof of actual mal-
ice8 before allowing private individuals to recover for alleged libels in-
volving matters of public interest.
The limits of the section 47(3) privilege, however, remain unclear,
particularly in the absence of a California Supreme Court ruling involv-
ing the application of section 47(3) to the defamation of a private indi-
vidual by a general readership publication. 9 Where the defamatory
statement concerns a public official or figure, and the publication is lim-
ited to an audience that has a legitimate interest in the conduct of that
person, the privilege may apply. 10 The more troubling area is where a
private individual is defamed by a story published for a diverse audi-
ence. California appellate courts have divided on whether a publisher
can share a sufficiently legitimate interest with a diverse audience for
the section 47(3) privilege to apply when the person defamed is not a
public official.
Given the United States Supreme Court's recent trend toward re-
6. Five states presently use a standard higher than negligence for a private plaintiff to
recover for defamation where the defamatory statements were on a subject of public interest.
Alaska, Colorado, Indiana, and NewJersey require a showing of New York Times actual malice.
See Gay v. Williams, 486 F. Supp. 12 (D. Alaska 1979) (actual malice is probably Alaska's
"minimum constitutional standard"); Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, 188 Colo. 86, 538
P.2d 450 (1975), cert. deiied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975) (adopting Rosenbloom); Aafco Heating &
Airconditioning Co. v. Northwest Pubs., Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976) (actual malice is required for all cases involving "truth, science,
morality and arts in general as well as responsible government"); Dairy Stores v. Sentinel Pub.
Co., 104 NJ. 125, 516 A.2d 220 (1986) (actual malice for matters of public interest). New
York appears to require a showing of gross irresponsibility for a private plaintiff to recover
where the defamatory statements involve a subject of legitimate public interest. See
Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, 38 N.Y.2d 196, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 341 N.E.2d 569
(1975).
7. CAL. Civ. CODE § 47(3) (West 1982) provides:
A privileged publication or broadcast is one made ....
3. In a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by
one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such relation to the person
interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the commu-
nication innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the
information.
8. It is uncertain whether California courts applying § 47(3) require New York Times or
common law actual malice. See notes 56, 99, 112, 153, 162 infra and accompanying text.
9. See Institute of Athletic Motivation v. University of Illinois, 114 Cal. App. 3d 1, 11,
170 Cal. Rptr. 411,417 (1980) (§ 47(3) is not "capable of precise or categorical definition");
R. HEINKE & R. LEVY, LITIGATING LIBEL AND INVASION OF PRIVACY CASES 41 (1984) ("Whether
there is a sufficient common interest between the mass media and its audience to make the
qualified privilege of § 47(3) apply to the media is an unsettled question."); Warren, Heinke,
Sager & Hinueber, Survey of California Libel and Privaty Law, in LDRC 50 STATE SURVEY 67 (H.
Kaufman ed. 1986) ("The extent to which section 47(3) protects the media is unsettled.").
10. See notes 50-56 infra and accompanying text; see also Maidman v.Jewish Publications,
Inc., 54 Cal. 2d 643, 355 P.2d 265, 7 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1960).
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stricting constitutional protection for free expression, 1 the expansion
of California's statutory privilege has taken on new national signifi-
cance. As the Supreme Court limits the protection offered by the first
amendment, states must decide whether to compensate for the reduced
federal protection of free expression through state constitutional provi-
sions, statutes, and common law. California's public interest privilege
offers one example of how states can protect expression that is at the
heart of the first amendment.
This note explores the "public interest" extension of California's
section 47(3) privilege. Part I explains the origins of the statute and its
common law context. Part II examines the judicial expansion of the
privilege and the current controversy regarding the privilege in Califor-
nia. Part III addresses the merits of an expanded privilege in light of
the traditional first amendment justifications for free speech. The note
concludes that although the privilege has been extended beyond its in-
tended and traditional applications, its extension clearly responds to
the first amendment interest in protecting speech that facilitates the
public's participation in government and therefore should be adopted
by the California Legislature or the California Supreme Court. 12
I. SECTION 47(3) AND ITS COMMON LAW CONTEXT
A. The Common Law Backdrop
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's constitutionalization of
libel law,' 3 courts had developed an elaborate common law of defama-
tion. Except where overridden by constitutional concerns, common
law continues to control most state libel actions.14 Under common law,
the publisher of a libel was held strictly liable for any defamation that
resulted. The plaintiff had to prove only the fact of publication and, in
some cases, 15 that her reputation had been damaged; the burden then
shifted to the publisher-defendant. The publisher could defend on one
11. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986) (articulat-
ing a less protective standard for commercial speech); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985) (limiting Gertz to communications on subjects of public
interest). But see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986); Philadelphia Newspapers
v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
12. For a different perspective on the extension of § 47(3), see Scott, Fair Comment in
California: An Unwelcome Guest, 57 S. CAL. L. Rv. 173 (1983) (student author). Scott concludes
that § 47(3), as applied in Rollenhagen, is "uncertain, if not unlimited, in scope." Id at 175.
The "strong need for simplicity and certainty in defamation law" necessitates that the exten-
sion should either be clarified and confirmed by the legislature or the courts, or be rejected in
favor of a "single standard for liability of media defendants who publish defamatory articles
about private citizens." Id at 196-97.
13. See notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text.
14. M. FRANKLIN, MASS MEDIA LAw 109 (3rd ed. 1987).
15. Proof of damage to reputation was required for libel per se, but not for libel per quod.
Libel per se refers to a publication that plainly, on its face, defames an identified individual;
libel per quod requires that the reader know some extrinsic fact in order for the publication to
be defamatory. See F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAw oF TORTS § 5.9(A) (1986).
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or more of only four grounds: truth, consent,16 absolute privilege, or
conditional privilege. Conditional privilege formed the common law
origin of California's section 47(3).
Conditional privileges protect those interests that are important to
public policy, but not so vital that courts can avoid balancing them
against an individual's reputational interests. 17 Most conditional privi-
leges apply to individuals. They protect communications involving the
speaker's interest, the interest of the hearer or receiver of the informa-
tion, and an interest held jointly between speaker and hearer. 18 The
two conditional privileges that have traditionally applied to the media
are fair comment, which protects statements of opinion about public
figures, 19 and fair report, which protects fair and accurate reports of
government proceedings. 20 To overcome a conditional privilege, the
plaintiff must show that the publisher was motivated by common law
actual malice-hatred, ill will, or spite-rather than by a desire to serve
the interest that the privilege was designed to protect.21
California's section 47(3) evolved from two of the common law con-
ditional privileges: common interest and fair comment.22 The com-
mon law common interest privilege protects communications made in
good faith on any subject in which both the speaker and the hearer have
an interest or duty.23 The common interest privilege traditionally ap-
plied only to communications between parties sharing a family inter-
est,24 a business interest,25 a professional interest, 26 or a religious
16. Truth and consent were absolute bars to recovery; they are not at issue here. For a
discussion of these defenses see id- §§ 5.17, 5.20.
17. Absolute privileges, in contrast to conditional privileges, apply to those communica-
tions that are so important to public policy that they must be allowed whatever damage they
may cause and despite any culpable intent on the part of the publisher. At common law, the
defense of absolute privilege is available for statements made in court, official communica-
tions between high-level public officials, and statements made during legislative and adminis-
trative proceedings. See R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § VI.2 (1980).
18. See id. § VI.3.
19. E.g., public officials, artists, playwrights, authors. See id. § IV.3.4 and cases cited
therein.
20. See id. §§ IV.3, VI.3.7.
21. See id. § VI.3.
22. See notes 29-39 infra and accompanying text.
23.
A communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the person
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged if
made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, even though it contains
matter which, without this privilege, would be actionable, and although the duty is
not a legal one, but only a moral or social duty of imperfect obligation.
33 AM. JUR. Libel and Slander § 126 (1941).
24. See, e.g., Zanley v. Hyde, 208 Mich. 96, 175 N.W. 261 (1919); Brown v. Radebaugh,
84 Minn. 347, 87 N.W. 937 (1901) (communication between relatives).
25. See, e.g., Philadelphia Wilmington & Baltimore R.R. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.)
202 (1858) (communications between a corporation and its stockholders); Bufalino v. Maxon
Bros., Inc., 368 Mich. 140, 117 N.W.2d 150 (1962) (communications between business
partners).
26. See, e.g., Judge v. Rockford Memorial Hosp., 17 Ill. App. 2d 365, 150 N.E.2d 202
(1958) (communications between two doctors).
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organizational interest.27 The privilege of fair comment protects ex-
pressions of opinion about public officials, scientists, artists, compos-
ers, performers, authors, and other persons who place themselves or
their work in the public eye.28
B. Origin of Section 47(3)
The California Legislature enacted section 47 of the Civil Code in
1872, in an effort to codify existing common law absolute and condi-
tional privileges. The conditional privileges of common interest and
fair comment were embodied in section 47(3).29
The legislative history of this Code section suggests that the Legis-
lature intended to restate the common law.30 The wording of section
47(3) is identical to that of section 31 in the original New York Civil
Code (part of the famous "Field Code"), which was published in 1865
as a codification of the common law.3 1 In the comments following sec-
tion 47(3), the California drafters cited to two New York cases address-
ing the common law conditional privilege of common interest.32 The
first of these cases, Thorn v. Moser,33 held that there is no recovery
against a party who speaks in the performance of a duty-legal or
moral, public or private-or in the assertion of his own rights or to
protect his own interest, without proof of "express malice."'34 The
drafters also cited Lewis & Herrick v. Chapman,35 which held that (1)
where a communication is made in answer to inquiries from one having
27. See, e.g., Slocinski v. Radwan, 83 N.H. 501, 144 A. 787 (1929) (communications be-
tween church members); Creswell v. Pruitt, 239 S.W.2d 165 (rex. Ct. App. 1951) (communi-
cation between members of a religious association).
28. The defense of fair comment requires five elements:
1. The subject of the comment must be of public concern;
2. The comment must be based upon facts which are stated or are readily ascertainable
by the public;
3. The facts must be true;
4. The comment must be entirely comment or criticism, not an allegation of fact; and
5. The comment must not be intended to harm another person.
See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 (1938).
The Restatement no longer recognizes the privilege of fair comment, since the Supreme
Court has arguably extended absolute protection to statements of opinion. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 606-10 (1981); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-
340 (1974) ("Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience ofjudges
and juries but on the competition of other ideas." [footnote omitted]).
This does not eliminate the privilege, however, since a number of states have applied fair
comment to protect certain statements of fact as well as opinion. See R. SACK, supra note 17, at
§ IV.3, IV.4.3.
29. See note 7 supra.
30. See Van Alstyne, The California Civil Code, in CAL. CIv. CODE 1-43 (West 1954).
31. N.Y. CrV. CODE § 31 (1865).
32. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 47 annotation (Hammond & Burch 1872).
33. 1 Denio 488 (1844) (an action for slander based on the defendant's allegation that
plaintiff forged a check).
34. Id. at 493.
35. 16 N.Y. 369 (1857) (an action for libel based on the defendant's implication that
plaintiff had delayed paying a bill).
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an interest in the information sought, or (2) where the relationship be-
tween the parties communicating is such as to make sharing the infor-
mation reasonable, the communication will be privileged.3 6
In addition to these cases, the drafters cited an 1859 treatise by
Francis Hilliard on the common law of torts.3 7 This treatise contains
the traditional statement of the common law common interest privi-
lege, taken from an 1855 English case, Harrison v. Bush.33 The citation
to these cases and to Hilliard's treatise, which set out the traditional
understanding of the common interest privilege, indicates that the
1872 Code drafters intended to codify the common law common inter-
est privilege.39
Section 47(3) was later amended to bring its language into present
tense and to remove gender-specific pronouns,40 but the text is other-
wise unchanged. Nonetheless, California courts have extended the sec-
tion 47(3) privilege far beyond the drafters' apparent intent.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 47(3)
In keeping with the drafters' intent, California courts have tradition-
ally applied section 47(3) to a variety of special relationships: commu-
nications by an employer to its employees regarding the termination of
a fellow employee, 4' complaints to a local bar association about an un-
ethical attorney,42 letters from an insurance company to a physician's
patients explaining why their claims were being denied,43 inquiries by a
bonding company and creditors about a contractor's financial condi-
tion,44 and complaints to a school principal by parents asserting mis-
conduct by their children's teacher.45 The courts, however, have also
extended section 47(3) to apply beyond these traditional special
relationships.
36. Id. at 374.
37. F. HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS (Boston 1859).
38. 5 El. & B1. (Q.B.) 344, 119 Eng. Rep. 509 (1855). The Harrison court defined the
privilege in these terms:
A communication made bonafide upon any subject matter in which the party commu-
nicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made
to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contain criminatory
matter which, without this privilege, would be slanderous and actionable.
Id. at 348, 119 Eng. Rep. at 512; see also F. HILLIARD, supra note 37, at 333-34.
39. The drafters cited to a third case, Perkins v. Mitchell, 31 Barb. 461 (1860), that in-
volved two doctors' testimony regarding the plaintiff's sanity before a justice of the peace.
This case implicated the common law privilege protecting communications made in judicial
hearings, contained in § 47(4), not § 47(3).
40. 1874 ACTs AMENDATORY OF THE CODES, PASSED AT THE TWENTIE7H SESSION OF THE
LEGISLATURE, 1873-74 184.
41. See Deaile v. General Tel. Co., 40 Cal. App. 3d 841, 115 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1974).
42. See Katz v. Rosen, 48 Cal. App. 3d 1032, 121 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1975).
43. See Slaughter v. Friedman, 32 Cal. 3d 149, 649 P.2d 886, 185 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1982).
44. See Gantry Constr. Co. v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 49 Cal. App. 3d 186, 122
Cal. Rptr. 834 (1975).
45. See Martin v. Kearney, 51 Cal. App. 3d 309, 124 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1975).
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A. The Extension of Section 47(3) to General Circulation Mass Media
Beginning as early as 1921, section 47(3) was applied to media de-
fendants, when the alleged libel was of sufficient interest to the public
or a defined segment of the public to meet section 47(3)'s common
interest requirement. In Snively v. Record Publishing Co.,46 the California
Supreme Court applied section 47(3) to a story imputing dishonesty to
the Los Angeles police chief that was published in a general circulation
newspaper. In 1942, the court of appeals in Harris v. Curtis Publishing
Co.47 applied section 47(3) to protect a story assailing the character of
the chairman of the Laguna Beach school board, even though the story
was printed in a national magazine. In 1946, in Glenn v. Gibson,48 the
court of appeals extended section 47(3) to protect an article that in-
volved no public official, published in a general circulation newspaper.
And in 1965, in Williams v. Daily Review, 49 the court of appeals again
applied section 47(3) to a general circulation newspaper where no pre-
existing or special interest relationship, or public official, was involved.
These cases constitute a drastic expansion of the section 47(3) privi-
lege. In each, the court relied on the importance of citizen participa-
tion in government to justify the extension.
In Snively v. Record Publishing Co. ,50 a newspaper's publication of a
cartoon imputing dishonesty to the Los Angeles police chief was held
to be protected by the section 47(3) privilege. The California Supreme
Court held that a newspaper of general circulation "stands in such rela-
tion to the people of the community in which it is published and circu-
lated that, with regard to publications therein concerning local public
officers," it fits within section 47(3).5 1
The court stated that it held the privilege to apply because "the offi-
cial conduct of public officers, especially in a government by the peo-
ple, is a matter of public concern of which every citizen may speak in
good faith and without malice."'52 This theme-that self-governing
people have the right to comment on the conduct of public officials-is
present throughout the opinion. The court noted that it did not matter
that the plaintiff was appointed rather than elected, since "[e]very citi-
zen has the right to apply ... for the removal of an unfit or corrupt
officer." 53
46. 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921).
47. 49 Cal. App. 2d 340, 121 P.2d 761 (1942).
48. 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 171 P.2d 118 (1946).
49. 236 Cal. App. 2d 405, 46 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1965).
50. 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921).
51. Id at 571, 198 P. at 3.
52. Id The interest that the Snively court is articulating has been characterized by Pro-
fessor Blasi as the "checking value" of free speech, namely, the role that uninhibited speech
can serve in checking the actions of government officials. See Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 521; see also notes 117-127 infra and accompany-
ing text.
53. 185 Cal. at 572, 198 P. at 3.
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The plaintiff had contended that since the published statements
were false, protecting them served no role in allowing the public to
fulfill its citizenry duties. The Snively court rejected this claim and
noted that it had rejected similar reasoning in prior cases. 54 If truth
were required for the privilege to attach, the privilege would be useless
since true speech is, by definition, not libelous. Moreover, the court
noted, the role of the public in bringing charges against officers is too
important to allow liability for honestly believed statements that turn
out to be false.55 As long as the publisher believes that a public official
has acted in a manner that reflects on his fitness for office, the publisher
is not liable for bringing that behavior to the attention of the people
served by the official. 56
The court of appeals again considered the extension of section
47(3) to a general circulation publication in Harris v. Curtis Publishing
Co. 57 The court applied section 47(3) to protect a story impugning the
character of the chairman of the Laguna Beach school board, even
though the story was printed in a national magazine, the Saturday Eve-
ning Post.
The court's rationale was not that the plaintiff was a public official,
but rather that he was involved in education and the statements attrib-
uted to him in the article, which he alleged constituted the defamation,
dealt with public education. Had the article focused on the plaintiff's
fitness for office, it would not have been privileged since it was pub-
lished to a far larger audience than had a legitimate interest, or vote, in
the Laguna Beach school board elections. Public education, on the
other hand, is a subject in which the court noted all citizens could have
a legitimate interest. "There is a marked distinction between the mak-
ing of such a purely local attack and a comment upon political views
and policies the effect of which cannot, from their very nature, be con-
fined to any locality."58
The court was careful not to limit its holding to cases involving
elected officials or public education. Instead, the court referred to a
publication "involving a matter of public policy or economic theory
which, while arising in a local community, is directly connected with
54. Id. at 574-76, 198 P. at 3-5.
55. See notes 132-133 infra and accompanying text.
56. 185 Cal. at 576, 198 P. at 5.
The court noted that the plaintiff must prove "malice" on the defendant's part to over-
come the privilege. The court defined "malice" as "a state of mind arising from hatred, or ill
will, evidencing a willingness to vex, annoy, or injure another person." Id. at 577, 198 P. at 5
(quoting Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 160, 116 P. 530, 537 (1911)). The Snively court went
on to note that this malice "may be inferred by the court or a jury where the charge is fUlse
and is libelous per se and the defendant publishes it without having probable cause for believ-
ing it to be true." Id. at 577, 198 P. at 5. The Snively court limited this inference of malice to
cases involving libel per se. For a discussion oflibelperse, see note 15 supra; see also F. HARPER,
F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 15, at § 5.9(A).
57. 49 Cal. App. 2d 340, 121 P.2d 761 (1942).
58. Id at 350, 121 P.2d at 766.
1208 [Vol. 39:1201
CALIFORNIA MEDIA PRIVILEGE
and may vitally affect the habits, modes of living and economic views of
people throughout the nation."59
By 1946, section 47(3) was held to apply to a newspaper of general
circulation where no public official was involved. In Glenn v. Gibson,60
the court of appeals applied the conditional privilege of section 47(3)
to a story published in a newspaper on local prostitution involving ser-
vicemen. The court stressed that the conduct of servicemen in a given
community, especially in time of war, was "of vital concern to every
right-thinking person" in that community.61 The court noted that, ac-
cording to the Restatement of Torts, communications that "affect a suf-
ficiently important public interest" are conditionally privileged. 62 The
court went on to quote the comments of the Restatement drafters on
applying the privilege to communications that facilitate the public's
role as active citizens. 63
In 1965, the court of appeals addressed section 47(3) in Williams v.
Daily Review. 64 The Daily Review, an Alameda County newspaper, pub-
lished an article criticizing delays by private engineering contractors in
completing a city paving project. The court once again emphasized
that the crucial issue in determining whether section 47(3) applied was
whether the publication was made in the public interest. The court ex-
plained that "public interest" applied not only to matters involving
public officials, but also to statements concerning private individuals
where the subject matter was of public concern.6 5 Reasoning that sec-
tion 47(3) embodied the common law conditional privilege of fair com-
ment, the Williams court indicated that public interest included
59. Id.
60. 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 171 P.2d 118 (1946), disapproved on other grounds, Lipman v.
Brisbane Elem. School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961).
61. 75 Cal. App. 2d at 659, 171 P.2d at 124. The court noted:
mhe complaint shows that the articles were published during times of war in a com-
munity where extensive war activities were being conducted, both civilian and mili-
tary, and where the welfare of those engaged therein was a matter of vital concern to
every right-thinking person. It would thus appear that the complaint on its face
shows that said publications came within the meaning of subdivision 3 of section 47
of the Civil Code ....
Id
62. Id (quoting 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 598(a)).
63.
The rule stated in this Section is applicable when any recognized interest of the pub-
lic is in danger, including the interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehen-
sion of criminals, the interest in the honest discharge of their duties by public
officers, and the interest in obtaining legislative relief from socially recognized evils.
Id at 660, 171 P.2d at 125-25 (quoting 3 REsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 598(a)).
64. 236 Cal. App. 2d 405, 46 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1965).
65.
[C]ontrary to plaintiffs' contention, the scope of the term "public interest" in Cali-
fornia is not limited to matters relating solely to public officials. Both the cases of
Glenn and Maidman applied the privilege to statements defaming private individuals,
where the subject matter of the article was determined to be of public interest or the
defamed individual of renown among a certain interest group.
Id at 417, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
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"qualifications or conduct of public officers or candidates for office"
and "the manner in which public ... institutions are administered," as
well as "the work of independent contractors which is being paid for
out of public funds and the work of employees of such contractors. '66
In California, then, even before the Supreme Court's decision in Ro-
senbloom, where a publication involved a matter of public interest, the
standard for recovering for libel was common law actual malice.6 7 Pub-
lic interest included not only the conduct and qualifications of public
officials, but also a broad variety of issues relating to the role of the
public as citizens-voters, advisors, monitors, initiators, and critics.
The Gertz Court's retreat from Rosenbloom removed the constitutional
basis for Rosenbloom's requirement of New York Times actual malice in
cases involving public interest and private plaintiffs; the Court, how-
ever, left states free to establish, or retain an already established, actual
malice standard-be it New York Times or common law malice. Thus,
Gertz reaffirmed the constitutionality of the judicial expansion of section
47(3).
B. The Current Confusion over Section 47(3): Rancho La Costa,
Rollenhagen, and Dalitz
Beginning in 1980, the California appellate courts reconsidered the
application of section 47(3) to general circulation media in three cases.
In the first, Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,6 8
the court of appeals held that the privilege did not apply to a story in
Penthouse Magazine about organized crime figures in California. In 1981,
a different panel of the court of appeals held in Rollenhagen v. City of
Orange6 9 that section 47(3) protected the broadcast of an auto
mechanic's arrest for fraud. Finally, in 1985, the court of appeals again
considered the Rancho La Costa facts in Dalitz v. Penthouse.70 The court
reasserted that the section 47(3) privilege did not apply. The differing
results in these cases, the variety of rationales that each panel of the
appellate court applied, and the absence of a recent California Supreme
Court ruling have left the limits of section 47(3) shrouded in confusion
and controversy.
1. Rancho La Costa.
More than a decade passed after Gertz was decided before the Call-
66. Id. (quoting 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 607).
67. See note 56 supra; note 112 infra.
68. 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1980), aff'd in par, rev'd in par4 Dalitz v.
Penthouse Int'l, 168 Cal. App. 3d 468, 214 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1985), cert denied, 450 U.S. 902
(1985).
69. 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981).
70. 168 Cal. App. 3d 468, 214 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1985). Part I of the court's opinion in
Dalitz was not certified for publication in the official reporter, but has been republished at I 1
Med. L. Rptr. (BNA) 2153 (1985).
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fornia courts had an opportunity to decide whether California was go-
ing to follow the Supreme Court in retreating from the New York Times
actual malice requirement in cases where a private individual was de-
famed by a story on a matter of public interest. In 1980, the court of
appeals addressed the question in Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court
of Los Angeles County.71 The case involved an article in Penthouse Magazine
that charged that the owners of the Rancho La Costa resort were mem-
bers of organized crime. The court of appeals focused on whether the
topic of the article was of sufficient interest to Penthouse's audience to
qualify the article for the section 47(3) privilege.
The court began, in line with earlier cases, by noting that section
47(3) does not apply to stories dealing with only "general public inter-
est" or the "mere general or idle curiosity of the general readership of
newspapers and magazines."' 72 Instead, the court initially concluded,
the interest involved must be a "pecuniary or proprietary interest,"
such as that shared by parties related by a "contractual, business or
similar relationship. ' 7 3 The court sought to distinguish previous appli-
cations of the privilege as involving either a public official7 4 or a "local
or special interest group, ' " 75 thereby denying that a public interest, in-
volving no contractual or business relationship, would qualify a publi-
cation for section 47(3) protection. This narrow interpretation of the
interest or relationship required to invoke the section 47(3) privilege
led the court to conclude that the privilege would not apply to an article
published to a "vast audience in a national magazine."' 76 The court
held that the present case did not qualify for the protection of section
47(3).
2. Rollenhagen.
The following year, the court of appeals addressed another case in
which a private individual was allegedly defamed by a publication on a
subject of public interest. Rollenhagen v. City of Orange77 involved a suit
brought by an auto mechanic against CBS after network affiliate KNXT
broadcast a segment showing the arrest of plaintiff for fraud in his auto
71. 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1980).
72. Id at 664-65, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
73. a d at 665, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
74. i at 666-67, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 360. The court cited to Snively v. Record Publishing
Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921), Harris v. Curtis Publishing Co., 49 Cal. App. 2d 340, 121
P.2d 761 (1942), and Everett v. California Teachers Association, 208 Cal. App. 2d 291, 25
Cal. Rptr. 120 (1962).
75. Rancho La Costa, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 667, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 360. The court cited to
Maidman v. Jewish Publications, 54 Cal. 2d 643, 355 P.2d 265, 7 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1960),
Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 197 P.2d 713 (1948), Toney v. State, 54
Cal. App. 3d 779, 126 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1976), Williams v. Daily Review, 236 Cal. App. 2d 405,
46 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1965), Glenn v. Gibson, 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 171 P.2d 118 (1946), and
Heuer v. Kee, 15 Cal. App. 2d 710, 59 P.2d 1063 (1936).
76. Rancho La Costa, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 665, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
77. 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981).
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repair business. CBS asserted that the broadcast was privileged under
section 47(3). The court of appeals agreed, concluding that free speech
principles are paramount to the privacy rights of public and private
plaintiffs, so long as the subject matter is of public interest and there is
no malice.78
The plaintiff argued that the Supreme Court's retreat in Gertz from
Rosenbloom's requirement of New York Times actual malice for publica-
tions on topics of public interest should lead California to relax its sec-
tion 47(3) actual malice standard as well. The court rejected this
argument, noting that the Gertz decision specifically left states free to
continue requiring New York Times or common law actual malice. Cali-
fornia's section 47(3) actual malice standard "predates Gertz by over 50
years and the only impact the Gertz decision has on the standard is to
decree it a constitutionally acceptable one." 79
3. Dalitz.
In 1985, the Rancho La Costa facts again reached the court of ap-
peals. In Dalitz v. Penthouse,80 two of the Rancho La Costa resort's of-
ficers appealed the trial court's determination that they were public
figures. The court, with two of its three judges having heard the origi-
nal Rancho La Costa case, rendered a 2-part opinion. The first part of
the opinion again dealt with section 47(3), but was not certified for
publication.8'
The court noted the confusion that had resulted from the conflict
between Rancho La Costa and Rollenhagen, and attempted to distinguish
the two. The Dalitz court indicated that the immediacy of the events in
Rollenhagen and the presence of an eyewitness warranted more protec-
tion than did the Rancho La Costa situation.8 2
The court appeared to recognize that the section 47(3) privilege ex-
tends beyond Rancho La Costa's requirement that the allegedly defama-
tory matter concern a "pecuniary or proprietary interest," public
official, or special interest shared by a defined group or association.
Instead, Dalitz acknowledged that section 47(3) may apply where the
public has a legitimate interest in the subject of the defamatory arti-
78.
Beginning with Snively v. Record Publishing Co ... the California courts have recog-
nized basic fair [sic) speech principles as paramount over plaintiffs whose status
might be private or public, so long as there was no malice, and the subject matter was
one of public interest ....
... If an individual becomes involved in a matter of public interest, whether he is
famous, infamous, or unknown, should be irrelevant ....
Id. at 420-22, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 52-53 (citations omitted). In referring to "fair speech," the
Rollenhagen court probably meant "free speech."
79. Id. at 422, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
80. 168 Cal. App. 3d 468, 214 Cal. Rptr. 254, 11 Media. L. Rep. (BNA) 2153 (1985).
81. 11 Media L. Rep. at 2153.
82. Id at 2156.
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cle.83 The court, however, would clearly apply a limited interpretation
of "public interest."'8 4 Penthouse's article, although dealing with organ-
ized crime and racketeering, apparently did not come within the Dalitz
court's definition of "public interest."
4. The conflict between the courts.
Each of the three panels of the court of appeals invoked different
views of section 47(3). The Rancho La Costa court believed the privilege
was intended to protect only contractual or pecuniary interests.85 The
court interpreted the judicial expansion of the privilege to reach only as
far as public officials or narrowly defined special interest groups. The
court cited to Snively v. Record Publishing Co.8 6 in the first category, and
Glenn v. Gibson87 and Williams v. Daily Review8s in the second. The court
ignored Harris v. Curtis Publishing Co.89 As a result, Rancho La Costa
found that the "strictly limited statutory qualified privilege is inapplica-
ble to a defamatory article published at large to a vast audience in a
national magazine." 90
The Rancho La Costa court did not explain why it accepted the most
dramatic expansion of section 47(3) in Snively-to apply to general cir-
culation media-and yet was unwilling to follow the public interest ra-
tionale that prompted that expansion to its logical conclusion. The
Rancho La Costa court's determination that section 47(3) could never
apply to an article published to a vast audience in a national magazine
excludes from protection an article discussing the fitness for office of a
national official, such as the President, even though the subject is within
the legitimate interest of people throughout the nation. The court's
arbitrary line, separating national media published to a vast audience
from all other forms of media, seems to contradict the Rancho La Costa
court's acceptance of Snively's extension of section 47(3) to protect arti-
cles dealing with public officials. The line also ignores the further ex-
tensions of section 47(3) by Glenn and Williams, which Rancho La Costa
cited, and Harris, which Rancho La Costa failed to note.
The Rancho La Costa court's distinction between an article published
"at large to a vast audience in a national magazine" and an article pub-
lished to "a local or special interest group and related to matters of
special concern," creates an inequitable and unworkable rule. The
identical story could be run in two publications, intended for the same
83. Id. at 2157.
84. Id
85. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 665, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
86. 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921).
87. 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 171 P.2d 118 (1946).
88. 236 Cal. App. 2d 405, 46 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1965).
89. 49 Cal. App. 2d 340, 121 P.2d 761 (1942).
90. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 665, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 359. For detailed criticism of the Rancho
La Costa court's reliance on precedent, see Heinke, Does Section 47(3) Protect the Press?, L.A.
DailyJ., Sept. 2, 1981, at 4, col. 4.
May 1987] 1213
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
audience, and yet under Rancho La Costa one publication might qualify
for the protection of section 47(3) while the other would not. For in-
stance, in Maidman v. Jewish Publications,9 1 the California Supreme Court
applied section 47(3) to a story about a leader in the Los Angeles Jew-
ish community, published to a primarily Jewish audience. Under
Rancho La Costa, that same story, if published in the Los Angeles Times to a
diverse audience, would not be privileged under section 47(3). Such a
distinction yields troubling results; yet the court in Rancho La Costa of-
fers no justification for this discrimination against general circulation
media.
In a passage that sheds light on its restrictive view of section 47(3),
the Rancho La Costa court went on to discuss generally the relationship
of the first amendment to section 47(3). The court indicated that in a
defamation action, the "right of privacy is paramount to the right of
free speech."' 92 Whatever the plaintiff's "right of privacy" may be-
and that remains uncertain-the Rancho La Costa court ignored the
Supreme Court's decisions in New York Times 93 and Gertz94 when it
penned this passage, since these and numerous subsequent Supreme
Court cases held the right of free speech, even where that speech was
false and defamatory, to be paramount to the public plaintiff's privacy
interests absent a showing of New York Times actual malice.
The court in Rollenhagen read section 47(3) as embodying the tradi-
tional common law conditional privilege of fair comment.95 Therefore,
the court reasoned, the privilege applied as long as the subject matter
of the publication was of "public interest" and the statements were
published without malice. The Rollenhagen court cited to Snively and
Glenn, among other cases, for the proposition that "California courts
have recognized basic fair [sic] speech principles as paramount over
plaintiffs whose status might be private or public, so long as there was
91. 54 Cal. 2d 643, 7 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1960).
92.
Under the mandate of recent federal Supreme Court rulings, the right of privacy is
paramount to the right of free speech when in the exercise of free speech a defend-
ant violates another's privacy by uttering a defamatory lie about him. The right of
free speech guaranteed by the state and federal Constitutions does not permit viola-
tion of the right of privacy .... Whatever privilege is accorded defendants under
Civil Code section 47(3), it must yield to the plaintiffs' constitutional rights of
privacy.
Id. at 667, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
93. 376 U.S. 254, 281 ("occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to
the public welfare, although at times such injury may be great") (quoting Coleman v. MacLen-
nan, 78 Kan. 711, 724, 98 P. 281, 286 (1908)).
94. 418 U.S. 323, 342. The New York Times actual malice standard
administers an extremely powerful antidote to the inducement to media self-censor-
ship of the common-law rule of strict liability for libel and slander. And it exacts a
correspondingly high price from the victims of defamatory falsehood. Plainly many
deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected to injury, will be unable
to surmount the barrier of the New York Times test.
Id.
95. 116 Cal. App. 3d at 420, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
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no malice, and the subject matter was one of public interest."'96
The court gave no definition for the term "public interest." It
turned to the issue only when it discussed the inconsistency between
the present case and Rancho La Costa, and was only able to conclude
that the Rancho La Costa definition of public interest was "broad enough
to encompass the case at bench."97 The court noted that fraud in the
auto repair business had been the subject of extensive legislative atten-
tion.98 Given that the article in Rancho La Costa concerned organized
crime and racketeering-also the subject of extensive state and federal
legislation--one can only assume that had the Rollenhagen court been
presented with the Rancho La Costa facts, it would have held section
47(3) to apply.99
The Rollenhagen court also discussed the plaintiff-based standards
established by New York Times and Gertz that defined the level of protec-
tion according to the status of the plaintiff. Rollenhagen noted that Cali-
fornia had chosen to accept the latitude granted the states in Gertz by
continuing to accord speech on topics of public interest a high standard
of protection through section 47(3).100 "If an individual becomes in-
volved in a matter of public interest, whether he is famous, or un-
known, should be irrelevant; there is no cogent reason to subject the
press to a varying standard of liability because of the subject's
status." 01
The Dalitz court, which included two of three judges who had de-
cided Rancho La Costa, noted the confusion that had resulted from the
conflict between Rancho La Costa and Rollenhagen, and attempted to dis-
tinguish the two. The Dalitz court indicated that the immediacy of the
events in Rollenhagen and the presence of a witness willing to make a
statement for the CBS cameras warranted more protection than did the
Rancho La Costa situation.10 2 The Dalitz court did not, however, explain
96. Id
97. Id at 426, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
98. Id.
99. The court in Rollenkagen briefly touched on the issue of which standard of actual
malice-common law orNew York Times-would be required to defeat the privilege in §§ 47(3)
and 47(4):
The trial court further stated, "We also find as a matter of law that there is no evi-
dence whatsoever of malice in this case on the part of either defendant whether we
use the term 'malice' in the constitutional sense applied by the United States
Supreme Court in Gertz [4e., New York Times actual malice] or as defined in the Civil
Code 48(a)4 ......
Id at 428-29, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
100. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text; note 147 infra.
101. 116 Cal. App. 3d at 422, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
102.
In Rollenhagen ... a specific event of public interest took place which CBS then re-
ported. Rollenhagen was being taken from his place of business in handcuffs, and
his former customer had come to his place of business and was making a statement to
CBS on film at their request.... By contrast, in the instant case, none of the plain-
tiffs were being led away from Rancho La Costa in handcuffs. No one had come
forward to Penthouse or any specific person as a percipient witness to any wrongdo-
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why. One explanation may be that the court felt the Rollenhagen facts
bore closer resemblance to the traditional one-to-one application of
section 47(3) than did those in Rancho La Costa. The California
Supreme Court indicated as early as 1921, however, that the privilege
need not be limited to a one-on-one or narrow special interest group
situation. 103
The Dalitz court acknowledged that section 47(3) may apply where
the public has a legitimate interest in the subject of the article. 10 4 The
court further noted that matters of "legitimate public concern" had tra-
ditionally been limited to "activities of public officials and political can-
didates, managers of public institutions or of private institutions that
substantially affect the public, independent contractors compensated
with public funds, and to public performances or exhibitions by musi-
cians, actors, athletes, artists and authors."' 0 5
This interpretation of public interest includes the traditional public
figures, comments about whom are protected by the fair comment priv-
ilege. It seeks to identify the speech that is important to society by fo-
cusing on who is swept up in that speech, rather than what the speech is
about. This is a fundamental difference between Rollenhagen and Dalitz;
the plaintiff-based standard was rejected by Rollenhagen in the passage
quoted above. 106 The actual speech that each court would seek to pro-
tect with section 47(3) may not be that different; but the standards by
which the courts identify what communications warrant protection ob-
viously are.
Both courts looked to "public interest." Dalitz sought to define the
scope of public interest by referring to the identity of the plaintiff. Rol-
lenhagen specifically rejected this approach, choosing instead to focus on
the content of the communication and the degree to which the commu-
nication fell within the legitimate interest of the audience, as partici-
pants in the government process, in receiving it.107 The subject matter
approach, which Rollenhagen employed, comports more closely with the
California courts' rationale for applying section 47(3) to statements
published in general circulation media.10s As discussed in Part III, that
approach also is more in line with the important first amendment inter-
est in fostering a free flow of the information necessary for a democ-
ing by any of the plaintiffs in Rancho La Costa and given reports which Penthouse
could then have quoted directly in its article.
11 Media L. Rep. at 2156.
103. In Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921), the court had pro-
tected the publication of a cartoon imputing dishonesty to the Los Angeles police chief in a
general circulation newspaper on the basis that a large part of the newspaper's readership, as
citizens, had a legitimate interest in the subject. See notes 50-56 supra and accompanying text.
104. 11 Media L. Rep. at 2157.
105. Id. (quoting Scott, supra note 12, at 180).
106. See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
107. See notes 97-101 supra and accompanying text.
108. See notes 46-66 supra and accompanying text.
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racy.10 9 Finally, Rollenhagen's content-based standard is less subject
than the Dalitz plaintiff-based standard to the many problems that have
attended the application of the New York Times/Gertz plaintiff-based
standard. 1 10 The Rollenhagen court, however, did not define "public in-
terest." The court failed to provide guidance for either other courts or
potential litigants about what communications are likely to be pro-
tected by section 47(3).111 As discussed in Part III, in order to realize
the benefits of the content-based approach that Rollenhagen followed, a
more systematic expression of the definition and limits of the self-gov-
ernance standard is necessary.
The precise limits of section 47(3) remain unclear after these three
cases. Certainly, where a special relationship exists between the pub-
lisher and the audience, the privilege applies. Where the publication
concerns a public official or figure, and the publication is limited to an
audience that has a legitimate interest in the conduct of that person, the
privilege may also be held to apply, even where the communication is
published in the general circulation media. Courts are most troubled
when a private individual is defamed by a story on a topic of public
interest published in the media to a diverse audience. Courts have fo-
cused on a variety of the following factors: the importance of the audi-
ence's interest, the specificity of the event, the speed with which the
public needed to know of its occurrence, and the portion of the audi-
ence that had a legitimate interest.1 12
III. RESOLVING THE JUDICIAL DISPUTE OVER SECTION 47(3) AND
"PUBLIC INTEREST"
Section 47(3) potentially offers publishers considerable protection
from libel actions by public and private plaintiffs where the publication
concerns a matter of public interest. Public interest has not been au-
thoritatively defined."13 Nonetheless, the courts that have extended
109. See notes 117-27 infra and accompanying text.
110. See notes 138-145 infra and accompanying text.
111. The Rollenhagen court's lack of guidance about how § 47(3) should be applied has
not prevented other courts from following Rollenhagen's lead. See Stevens v. Rifkin, 608 F.
Supp. 710, 733 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (court held that, following Rollenhagen, statements broadcast
by ABC affiliate KGO-TV to the effect that plaintiffs had shot a police officer were in the
"public interest" as required by § 47(3)); Beasley v. Hearst Corp., I 1 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2067 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1985) (court held that misidentification ofplaintiffas suspect in murder
manhunt in local newspaper was protected under § 47(3)).
112. It also remains unclear precisely what standard of actual malice is required in Cali-
fornia to defeat the § 47(3) privilege. According to § 48(a)(4), the common law actual malice
standard is required, but the Snively court's interpretation of that standard, which allows ac-
tual malice to be inferred where the statement is false and the defendant lacks probable cause
for believing it to be true, is quite similar to the New York Times "knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard of the truth" standard. 185 Cal. 565, 577, 198 P. 1, 6 (1921). As argued
below, the New York Times actual malice standard, to the extent it differs from the § 48(a)(4)
standard as applied by California courts, is preferred. See note 153 infra.
113. Public interest clearly encompasses more than just subjects directly relating to the
conduct of public officials; otherwise, the Rollenhagen and Dalitz courts would not have had to
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section 47(3) to protect statements made in the general circulation me-
dia to a diverse audience have consistently stressed the public's interest
in knowing about issues that are relevant to the public's role as citizens.
This extension responds closely to the most important and most widely
accepted first amendment rationale for protecting speech: self-
governance.
A. The First Amendment and Self-Governance
The traditional justifications for the first amendment's protection of
speech and press divide into four categories: self-fulfillment, 114 safety-
valve,1 5 marketplace of ideas,1 6 and self-governance.11 7 Of these cat-
go beyond Rancho La Costa's restrictive interpretation of the privilege, which included apply-
ing the privilege to stories about public officials. Rancho La Costa, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 666,
165 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
It is equally clear that public interest must not include all matters about which the public
is interested or curious, since this would effectively create a carte blanche privilege for the
media.
114. The self-fulfillment rationale for free expression is a notion of natural right or abil-
ity: People have a natural ability and desire to think freely and to express themselves freely.
"Hence suppression of belief, opinion, or other expression is an affront to the dignity of man,
a negation of man's essential nature." T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION
6 (1970). To legally protect this ability is not only morally important, but also practically
beneficial to society as a whole. Individuals would be repressed and frustrated by limitations
on their free expression. They would not develop themselves or their ideas as fully; therefore,
they would contribute less to society. Moreover, to limit man's "search for truth, or his ex-
pression of it, is to elevate society and the state to a despotic command over him and to place
him under the arbitrary control of others." Id.; see also Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Free-
dom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964 (1978); Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv.
591 (1982).
115. The safety-valve rationale was articulated by Justice Brandeis, who wrote in Whitney
v. California that those who fought for American independence believed that:
[I]t is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds re-
pression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the
path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and pro-
posed remedies; and'that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis,J., concurring). By limiting the ability of an individual to
convince others of his ideas through spoken or written advocacy, laws curbing free expression
encourage discontent and violence. See T. EMERSON, TowARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 11-15 (1966). "Suppression of opposition may well mean that when
change is finally forced on the community it will come in more violent and radical form." IL
at 12.
116. The marketplace of ideas rationale for protecting free expression is that society
benefits from an uninhibited exchange of ideas. John Locke wrote:
[T]he business of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions .... For the truth
certainly would do well enough if she were once left to shift for herself.... She is
not taught by laws, nor has she any need of force to procure her entrance into the
minds of men .... [I]f truth makes not her way into the understanding by her ov
light, she will be but the weaker for any borrowed force violence can add to her.
J. LOCKE, A LETrER CONCERNING TOLERATION 45-46 (P. Romanell ed. 1955) (1st ed. 1689); see
alsoJ. MILL, ON LIBERTY 18, 28-29 (D. Spitz ed. 1975) (1st ed. 1859).
The marketplace of ideas rationale does not require believing that truth will always tri-
umph over falsehood. Rather, part of the justification stems from the idea that truth is not
always easily recognized, and that truth may arise out of what was once perceived as false-
hood. It is therefore important that all speech-whether viewed as true or false-be placed
before the public. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,J., dissent-
ing) ("But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
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egories, the California courts have relied on the self-governance ration-
ale when extending section 47(3) to protect general readership
publications.
According to the self-governance rationale, the first amendment
protects unfettered free speech because in a democratic society the
public must have all information necessary to "govern." Alexander
Meiklejohn, one of the most outspoken proponents of the self-govern-
ance rationale, has written that a democratic society which depends on
its members to be both citizens and rulers must be open to discussion
about and criticism of government, allowing even for "arguments
against our theory of government."118
Meiklejohn advances three arguments for applying the first amend-
ment to "those activities of thought and communication by which we
'govern.' "119 First, Meiklejohn argues that the first amendment's pro-
hibition of restrictions on speech stems from the fundamental principle
that "We, the People" are sovereign and therefore responsible for gov-
erning.1 20 "All constitutional authority to govern the people of the
United States belongs to the people themselves, acting as members of a
corporate body politic. '12 1
Second, Meiklejohn contends, the people have given only limited
authority, through the Constitution, to "subordinate agencies" that
carry on part of the business of governing. The people have not dele-
gated all of their power. In the Constitution, they have provided for
the direct exercise of some of their power, through voting.1 22 In this
light, Meiklejohn refers to the public as an integral part of the govern-
ment, as essential for the legitimate, orderly functioning of government
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ulti-
mate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas ... ").
117. See T. EMERSON, supra note 115, at 8-11; M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH § 1.02(H) (1984).
118. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 65-66
(1948).
Shall we, then, as practitioners of freedom, listen to ideas which, being opposed to
our own, might destroy confidence in our form of government? Shall we give a hear-
ing to those who hate and despise freedom, to those who, if they had the power,
would destroy our institutions? Certainly, yesl ... We listen, not because they desire
to speak, but because we need to hear. If there are arguments against our theory of
government, our policies in war or in peace, we the citizens, the rulers, must hear
and consider them for ourselves. That is the way of public safety. It is the program
of self-government.
Id.
119. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 255.
120. James Madison, in the report that accompanied the Virginia Resolutions of 1798,
wrote in opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts: "The people, not the government, pos-
sess the absolute sovereignty." 4 ELJoT's DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTrrunrON 569
(1876). In the debate over the passage of the Acts in the House of Representatives, Madison
added: "the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Govern-
ment over the people." 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 974 (1794).
121. Meiklejohn, supra note 119, at 253.
122. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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as the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. 123 In addition,
Meiklejohn notes that the people have also reserved powers as pro-
vided by the tenth amendment. 124
Finally, Meiklejohn and many commentators argue, an uninhibited
flow of information relating to self-governance is practically essential if
the public is to exercise its function of electing and advising public
officials. 12 5
The importance of speech relating to self-governance and its cen-
trality to the first amendment are virtually unchallenged. Considerable
controversy surrounds the definition of "self-governance" and the ex-
tent to which the first amendment protects speech that does not involve
self-governance. 126 But there is broad consensus on the basic thesis
that self-governance speech is not only within the first amendment's
protection; it is at the core of that protection.
The vital importance of self-govemance speech has run through
many United States Supreme Court opinions. The Court has repeat-
edly asserted that:
expression on public issues "has always rested on the highest rung of
the hierarchy of First Amendment values." "[S]peech concerning pub-
lic affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-govern-
ment." There is a "profound national commitment" to the principle
that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open."1 27
123. Meiklejohn, supra note 119, at 253-56. For more on the proposition that the very
structure of the government created by the Constitution requires that speech about self-gov-
ernance be unfettered, see Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
LJ. 1, 23 (1971):
The first amendment indicates that there is something special about speech. We
would know that much even without a first amendment, for the entire structure of the
Constitution creates a representative democracy, a form of government that would
be meaningless without freedom to discuss government and its policies. Freedom
for political speech could and should be inferred even if there were no first
amendment.
Id.
124. Meiklejohn, supra note 119, at 253-54. "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
125. See note 126 infra.
126. See generally A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975) (first amendment interest
in self-governance protects speech that serves to make the political process work through
lawful means); A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 118; BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech:
An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. Rav. 299 (1978) (limiting first
amendment protection to political speech, but asserting that nonpolitical speech may be pro-
tected as well to assure that no political speech is chilled); Blasi, supra note 52 (first amend-
ment protects speech necessary for the press to serve its role in checking the actions of
government officials); Bork, supra note 123 (first amendment protects only speech dealing
"explicitly and specifically and directly with politics and government"); Meildejohn, supra note
119 (to foster the public's role as self-governing citizens, the first amendment protects speech
on all topics necessary to that role, including education, philosophy, science, literature, and
the arts).
127. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (citations omitted);
see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19
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One of the most difficult problems with the self-governance ration-
ale is determining what is included in the term "self-governance."
Certainly the public acts and statements of elected officials and candi-
dates are included, 128 but what about the acts and statements of ap-
pointed officials, or private acts of public officials, or subjects tangential
to officials' public acts, such as topics warranting their or the voters'
attention? The self-governance rationale should also protect communi-
cation of this information because it directly relates to the public's role
in government, including selecting, advising, and criticizing
representatives. 129
The conduct of an appointed official often bears directly on the re-
sponsibilities of an elected official. The action or inaction of an elected
official in reviewing, censuring, or removing an appointed official who
is derelict in his duties is relevant to whether the elected official should
be returned to office. The private acts of an elected official are also
relevant to her fitness for office. Voters need to know whether the offi-
cial has a record of dishonesty, lack of moral character, or illegal con-
duct in order to cast their ballots wisely.130
Events that are tangential to the government official's duties should
also be brought before the voters. Are there important issues that the
official is ignoring, or of which she is not aware? Is the official pursuing
her duties efficiently, and considering the least costly and least intrusive
methods of solving identified problems? If the term "self-governance"
did not reach to such areas, it would be useless as a rationale for the
first amendment's protection of speech. A public official could remove
a topic from the realm of protected public discourse simply by avoiding
it. The term "self-governance" must also apply to those communica-
tions necessary for the public to initiate, evaluate, criticize, and vote on
ballot referenda and initiatives, since these are constitutional means
through which the public participates in government. 13'
(1966) ("Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there
is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs."); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957) (the first amendment was "fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people");
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The maintenance of the opportunity for
free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the peo-
ple and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the secur-
ity of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.").
128. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Mills, 384 U.S. at 218.
129. The Supreme Court in New York Times referred to the "citizen-critic" and his "duty
to criticize." 376 U.S. at 282 (emphasis added).
130. The Supreme Court in Gertz noted that "the public's interest extends to 'anything
which might touch on an official's fitness for office.... Few personal attributes are more
germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even
though these characteristics may also affect the official's private character.' " 418 U.S. at 344-
45 (citations omitted) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964)).
131. See BeVier, supra note 126, at 358 ("the need to protect political speech fully in
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The thrust of the self-governance rationale is that the citizenry must
have all of the information necessary to choose, monitor, and advise its
representatives intelligently, as well as to propose, discuss, and vote on
ballot issues. If those who try to bring that information before the pub-
lic are held liable for their errors, they will be less likely to communi-
cate the information in the first place.' 3 2 For this reason, "[t]he First
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to pro-
tect speech that matters."1 33
B. Line-Drawing and the First Amendment
Defining precisely what is to be protected under the rubric of "self-
governance" is an arduous and largely unobtainable goal, but this does
not mean that the task of line-drawing can be avoided. Line-drawing in
a number of first amendment areas-such as obscenity,' 34 pornogra-
phy,13 5 and commercial speech '36-has proved difficult, but it has
nonetheless been unavoidable. The most simple and predictable line
to draw is an arbitrary one that disregards first amendment interests
and the practical demands of administering a democracy. Courts, how-
ever, are constrained by the first amendment. The search for where to
draw the boundary lines of any privilege requires a balance between the
certainty of the arbitrarily drawn line and the subtlety that first amend-
ment interests dictate.' 3 7
practice may justify the Court's extending first amendment protection to categories of speech
other than the strictly political").
132. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in New York Times:
The constitutional protection does not turn upon "the truth, popularity, or social
utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered." As Madison said, "Some degree of
abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing; and in no instance is this
more true than in that of the press." . . . [E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free
debate, and.., it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
"breathing space" that they "need... to survive .... " "The protection of the public
requires not merely discussion, but information .... Errors of fact, particularly in
regard to a man's mental states and processes, are inevitable.... Whatever is added
to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate."
376 U.S. at 271-72 (citations omitted).
133. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341.
134. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986); Brockett v. Spo-
kane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491 (1985); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Miller v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
135. See Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 153; American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323
(7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986).
136. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986); Lowe v.
Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Bolger v. Young's Drug Prods., 463 U.S.
60 (1983); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
137. On the difficulty of drawing lines generally in the first amendment area, Robert
Bork wrote:
Not too much should be made of the undeniable fact that there will be hard cases.
Any theory of the first amendment that does not accord absolute protection for all
verbal expression, which is to say any theory worth discussing, will require that a
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In the defamation area, the New York Times/Butts 138/Gertz distinction
between public officials, public figures, and private persons has proved
unclear and has yielded bizarre results.13 9 In Gertz, the Court claimed
to "have no difficulty in distinguishing among defamation plaintiffs," 140
but that task has not turned out to be so easy.' 41 Marc Franklin has
argued that the Gertz approach has produced anomalous results,142 it
has proved hard to administer, 143 and it offers little guidance to pub-
lishers as to what will and will not be found to be libelous. 144 "All of
these consequences," writes Franklin, "flow from the Court's attempt
to avoid the natural approach-one based on granting highest protec-
tion to speech about self-governance.' 45
Drawing lines based on content between subjects of legitimate pub-
lic interest and subjects that are not of public interest is also a difficult
spectrum be cut and the location of the cut will always be, arguably, arbitrary. The
question is whether the general location of the cut isjustified. The existence of close
cases is not a reason to refuse to draw a line and so deny majorities the power to
govern in areas where their power is legitimate.
Bork, supra note 123, at 28.
138. The U.S. Supreme Court in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967),
extended the requirement of actual malice, which New York Times had applied to public offi-
cials, to public figures.
139. See Branson & Sprague, The Public Figure-P ivate Person Dichotomy: A Flight From First
Amendment Reality, 90 DIcK. L. REv. 627 (1986); Franklin, Constitutional Libel Law: The Role of
Content, 34 UCLA L. REv. - (1987) (forthcoming).
140. 418 U.S. at 344.
141. Compare Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976) (Johnny Carson
held to be a public figure) and Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193
Cal. Rptr. 206 (1983) (Carol Burnett held to be a public figure) withJenoffv. Hearst Corp.,
644 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1981) (police informant charged with breaking into attorney's office
held to be private) and Lawrence v. Moss, 639 F.2d 634 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1031
(1981) (political advisor to Senate candidate held to be private). The Supreme Court itself
has had considerable difficulty with the public/private plaintiff distinction. See, e.g., Wolston v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). See
generally Franklin, supra note 139.
142.
[The Gertz Court's] desire to avoid analyzing content protects speech about alleged
encounters between famous people in restaurants more than it protects discussions
about the political behavior of the aides and supporters of candidates in elections.
In the usual First Amendment case it was unthinkable that self-governance
speech would wind up less protected than "other" speech. In libel cases that is pre-
cisely what has happened in some cases.
Franklin, supra note 139, at - (footnotes omitted).
143. Professor Franklin notes the difficulty that lower courts face regarding the defini-
tion of public figure. "In some cases, the courts, realizing that the plaintiff must be found
'public' in order for the actual malice standard to apply, have stretched to hold 'public' many
lower-level government employees, such as elementary school teachers, police, and others."
Id. at - (footnotes omitted).
144.
[I]t is important that the speakers know the rules in advance. As matters now stand,
it is increasingly difficult for editors or publishers or their lawyers to predict whether
a court will determine a plaintiff to be public or private.... Surely editors would be
in a much better position to determine accurately whether speech implicates "self-
governance."




task. It is important, however, since it allows courts to tailor liability for
defamation based on how directly the topic of the publication responds
to first amendment interests.
Moreover, after the Supreme Court's decision in Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,146 courts may be required to consider
whether the speech in question involves an issue of public interest.
The Supreme Court in Gertz allowed states to adopt their own stan-
dards, so long as they did not impose liability without fault, or punitive
damages without proof of New York Times actual malice. 14 7 In Dun &
Bradstreet, however, the Court redefined Gertz to require courts once
again to investigate whether the defamation of a private person in-
volved a subject of public interest. The Court held that the Gertz re-
quirement of New York Times actual malice for awards of punitive
damages applied only where the story at issue concerned a subject of
public interest. 148 The publications of Dun & Bradstreet-a financial
reporting service-did not qualify. After Dun & Bradstreet, it seems in-
evitable that state courts, hearing defamation actions brought by pri-
vate plaintiffs, will have to consider whether the defamatory
communication was on a subject of legitimate public interest.
The more clearly the line delimiting legitimate public interest can
be drawn, the more helpful it will be for both potential litigants and
courts. A clear privilege increases the publisher's ability to predict
what will be actionable libel, and the potential plaintiff's ability to de-
termine whether his case is likely to succeed at trial. Moreover, a more
clearly defined privilege allows courts to decide more cases as a matter
of law through pretrial motions, thereby saving both parties the high
cost of litigation. 149
Thus, even though line-drawing in the first amendment area has
proved difficult, it is unavoidable. The goal of courts drawing those
lines should be to make them correspond as closely as possible to first
amendment interests, without making them impossible to administer
equitably and efficiently. After Dun & Bradstreet, it is clear that whatever
146. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
147. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48 (footnote omitted) ("We hold that, so long as they do not
impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard
of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual.").
148. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2944-46.
149. The Supreme Court in New York Times commented on the high cost of litigation and
its effect on the media:
Under such a rule [strict liability, with defendant required to prove truth], would-be
critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it
is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it
can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make
only statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful zone." The rule thus damp-
ens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.
376 U.S. at 279 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). See Franklin, Good
Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F. L. REv 1 (1983).
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plaintiff-based standards exist as a result of New York Times/Butts/Gertz,
courts are also going to have to draw lines based on content. As they
do so, courts should seek to avoid the clumsily arrived at, and often
inequitable, results of the plaintiff-based standard. 150
C. Proposed Interpretation
Section 47(3)-as it has been judicially expanded-responds to the
self-governance rationale for protecting free speech. By protecting
publishers who bring to the public's attention issues that directly relate
to the public's role as citizens, section 47(3) encourages the activity that
the Supreme Court has repeatedly found to be at the heart of first
amendment values. 15'
For the privilege to respond as closely as possible to the most im-
portant justifications for free speech, the term "public interest" should
be defined to include subjects that directly contribute to the public's
ability to carry out its role in a democracy. This includes the communi-
cations necessary to evaluate candidates' fitness for office; to monitor
and criticize government officials; to inform and advise elected repre-
sentatives; and to initiate, evaluate, and vote on ballot issues. 152 Public
interest should not be limited to specific events, nor should it be inap-
plicable to a national publication, where the subject of the publication
is in the public interest of a national audience. On the other hand, the
privilege should not protect stories that, while they may be interesting
to members of the public, do not enhance their abilities as citizens. 153
While earlier discussions have tried to describe this standard in
terms of what the role of an active citizen in a democracy entails, some
examples of applications of the standard might clarify what it would
and would not protect. Under the self-governance standard, the sec-
tion 47(3) privilege would protect allegations in a Los Angeles newspa-
per-whether in a cartoon or an editorial-that the Los Angeles police
chief is unfit for duty. 154 Section 47(3) would apply to stories' 55 in a
150. See notes 1-5 & 138 supra and accompanying text.
151. See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
152. See notes 128-131 supra and accompanying text.
153. For plaintiffs to overcome the privilege, courts require a showing of New York Times
actual malice. This would be a change from the definition of "actual malice" provided in
§ 48(a)(4), which defines the term to mean hatred, ill will, or spite. The Snively court, how-
ever, has already indicated that common law actual malice in California may be inferred where
the statement is false and the defendant lacked probable cause for believing it to be true; this
parallels New York Times' "knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth" standard.
See notes 56 & 112 supra and accompanying text. The change would make California's com-
mon law standard conform with the New York Times constitutional standard. Courts consider-
ing cases where both New York Times or Gertz and § 47(3) were invoked would only have to
make one determination as to whether there is evidence of "actual malice."
154. See Snively, 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921).
155. The extent to which a story must deal with self-governance, or the degree to which
one statement dealing with self-governance might protect other statements in the same story
that are unrelated to self-governance, is unclear. Obviously, the press must be prevented
from using § 47(3) to protect otherwise actionable defamation by adding a tangential refer-
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local paper about the regulation of prostitution and/or the conduct of
military personnel based in that locale. 15 6 The privilege would also ap-
ply to criticism of city-funded contractors published in that city's
newspaper. 5 7
Section 47(3) would protect a television broadcast about the illegal
business practices of an auto mechanic in the broadcast station's view-
ing audience.' 58 The privilege would also protect the publication in a
national newspaper or magazine of an investigative report alleging that
a real estate development project was a front for organized crime. 59
This is a more difficult case than the earlier examples, because the reg-
ulation of the resort arguably falls within the self-governance interest of
a county or state. However, given the federal government's activities in
regulating organized crime, the fact that organized crime extends be-
yond county or state borders, and the legitimate interest of every citi-
zen in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals, the
section 47(3) privilege would seem to protect the article, even when
published to a national audience.
The scope of section 47(3)'s protection is not limitless. Stories
aboutJohnny Carson's personal life160 or Carol Burnett's activities in a
Washington restaurant1 61 would not be protected. A San Francisco
gossip column report about a corrupt Los Angeles police chief would
probably also not be protected, because the San Francisco readership
has little legitimate interest in the Los Angeles police chief's fitness for
office. If that same story dealt with an innovative crime fighting pro-
gram that the Los Angeles police chief had begun, its publication in a
San Francisco or even a national newspaper would arguably be pro-
tected by section 47(3). In all of these cases, proof of actual malice
would defeat the California privilege. 162
The exact boundaries of the privilege are still not plain, but there is
a standard-self-governance-against which the case-by-case decisions
can be measured and about which there is more consensus on interpre-
tation than with the "general public interest" standard announced in
ence to a self-governance interest. One possibility is to consider whether the part dealing
with self-governance was intrinsic to the subject of the story or whether it was added merely to
insulate unrelated defamatory statements. Another possibility is to consider whether the de-
famatory statements, taken by themselves, would independently come within the self-govern-
ance interpretation of § 47(3).
156. See Glenn, 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 171 P.2d 118 (1946), disapproved on other grounds
Lipman v. Brisbane Elem. School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961).
157. See William, 236 Cal. App. 2d 405, 46 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1965).
158. See Rollenhagen, 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981).
159. See Rancho La Costa, 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1980), af'd in part,
rev'd in part, Dalitz v. Penthouse Int'l, 168 Cal. App. 3d 468, 214 Cal. Rptr. 254, cert. denied 450
U.S. 902 (1985).
160. See Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
161. See Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206
(1983).
162. If that actual malice is New York Times actual malice, such a showing would defeat
the federal constitutional protection as well.
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Rosenbloom and rejected in Gertz. Moreover, as more cases are decided
in which the scope of "public interest" is defined, the application of
section 47(3) will become easier, and the results are likely to be more
uniform.
Section 47(3) offers California courts the opportunity-to the extent
allowed by Gertz-to move beyond the New York Times/Butts/Gertz plain-
tiff-based approach, which has yielded anomalous and unpredictable
results and has proven difficult to administer. Such a move comports
with Dun & Bradstreet's requirement that courts hearing defamation ac-
tions brought by private plaintiffs consider whether the allegedly de-
famatory statements involved a subject of public interest. By applying
the public interest requirement of section 47(3) to communications that
provide the public with the information necessary to choose, monitor,
and advise their representatives intelligently, as well as to propose, dis-
cuss, and vote on ballot issues, California courts can reach the optimal
balance between a clearly defined standard and one that directly serves
central first amendment interests.
CONCLUSION
Section 47(3) of the California Civil Code was originally enacted as
a codification of the common law of libel's conditional privilege pro-
tecting communications between parties sharing a special interest. The
courts, beginning in 1921 with Snively v. Record Publishing Co.,163 ex-
tended the section 47(3) privilege to protect communications published
in the media to a diverse audience, where the subject of the communi-
cations was within the legitimate public interest of the audience. Sec-
tion 47(3) was subsequently interpreted to protect a broad range of
statements published in the general media to a diverse audience.
Three 1980s court of appeals cases-Rancho La Costa, Rollenhagen, and
Dalitz-however, have left the limits of the privilege unclear.
This note has argued for recognition by the California Supreme
Court or California Legislature of a more expansive interpretation of
section 47(3). Under this broader reading, the privilege would apply to
all media, regardless of the status of the plaintiff, so long as the publica-
tion served a role in providing the public with the information neces-
sary to choose, monitor, and advise their representatives intelligently,
as well as to propose, discuss, and vote on ballot issues. This applica-
tion responds to the first amendment interest in protecting communi-
cations that help the public better participate in government. It
encourages publishers and broadcasters to engage in this activity by
providing them with a high level of protection, and helps all parties
avoid the soaring costs of going to trial. On the other hand, this stan-
dard protects the public from abuse of the privilege by prohibiting its
163. 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921).
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application where the alleged defamation does not involve an issue
concerning self-governance. It limits the privilege to precisely those
types of communications that the Supreme Court has stressed the first
amendment is designed to protect.
